RIVERKEEPER & THE INDIAN POINT SAFE ENERGY COALITION

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:
Date: April 26, 2004

For more information contact:
Kyle Rabin, 845-424-4149 x 239
Grant Captanian, 212-423-9920

Coalition Unveils 15-Point Plan to Strengthen Upcoming Indian Point Emergency Exercise

Nuclear Emergency Exercise Must Be Based on Realistic Scenarios

White Plains, NY – Today, member organizations from the Indian Point Safe Energy Coalition spoke out about the upcoming emergency preparedness exercise for the Indian Point nuclear power plant situated 35 miles north of midtown Manhattan. At a press conference this morning, the IPSEC coalition released a 15-point plan that, if incorporated into the upcoming exercise, would provide for a more realistic assessment of the adequacy of the Indian Point emergency plan. (The press conference was held on the anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster, the world’s worst nuclear plant accident which resulted in radioactive fallout around the world.)

On June 8, 2004 the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which now is part of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, will evaluate an exercise in the plume exposure pathway around the Indian Point nuclear power plant. The primary purpose of the exercise is to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency in the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ).

“If FEMA’s top priority is protecting public health and safety in the event of a radiological release at Indian Point, then the upcoming exercise must be based on a fast-breaking release scenario and the whole exercise must be open to independent evaluation,” said Alex Matthiessen, executive director of Riverkeeper. “Only a realistic scenario could evaluate the true adequacy of Indian Point’s emergency plan. Another staged exercise will be worse than meaningless – it constitutes reckless endangerment of human lives.”

“Following the Witt review – which declared that Indian Point’s emergency plan was not capable of dealing with a fast-breaking release scenario – no material changes have been made to improve the emergency plan,” said Grant Captanian, coordinator for the Indian Point Safe Energy Coalition. “FEMA has yet to explain to the public and local first responders what improvements have been made to the exercise procedure.”

On April 22nd, Riverkeeper and IPSEC delivered a letter to DHS/FEMA with our 15 recommendations enclosed.

IPSEC is urging DHS/FEMA to assess the ability of the emergency plan to respond to:

• A scenario involving a fast breaking release of radiation that results in the contamination of a significant portion of the 10-mile EPZ and the 50-mile ingestion pathway zone.
• A scenario involving major transportation arteries that are rendered impassable (either by acts of terrorism or gridlock) to people evacuating.
• A scenario in which the radioactive plume travels beyond the 10-mile radius and threatens to expose citizens with higher-than-acceptable doses.
• A scenario in which a large number of people, who have been injured and contaminated and require treatment and decontamination.

IPSEC is also urging local, state, and federal officials to press for these measures in formal requests to DHS/FEMA.

Radioactive Release Could Dwarf Chernobyl’s

According to a spring 2003 Princeton study published in the journal Science and Global Security, the consequences of a spent fuel fire disaster at a nuclear power plant would be the release of a radiation plume that could contaminate eight to 70 times more land than the area affected by the 1986 accident in Chernobyl. The 2003 study stated that the cost of such a disaster would run into the hundreds of billions of dollars. The spent fuel pools at Indian Point are not housed under a robust, containment building.

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To view the 15 point plan and the letter to DHS/FEMA visit Riverkeeper’s Indian Point webpage: http://riverkeeper.org/campaign.php/indian_point and click on the press release section.


BACKGROUND INFORMATION


REGULATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

On December 7, 1979, President Jimmy Carter directed the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to assume the lead responsibility for all offsite nuclear planning and response. FEMA’s activities are conducted pursuant to 44 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 350, Part 351, and Part 352. These regulations are a key element in the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program established after the Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station accident in March 1979.

The FEMA rule, 44 CFR 350, establishes the policies and procedures for FEMA’s initial and continued approval of State and local governments’ radiological emergency planning and preparedness for commercial nuclear power plants. This approval is contingent, in part, on State and local government participation in joint exercises with licensees.

DHS/FEMA’s responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for nuclear power facilities include the following:

• Taking the lead in offsite emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of radiological emergency plans and procedures developed by State and local governments;
• Determining whether such plans and procedures can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans and procedures conducted by State and local governments;
• Responding to requests by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding between the NRC and FEMA (Federal Register, Volume 58, Number 176, September 14, 1993); and
• Coordinating the activities of the following Federal agencies with responsibilities in the radiological emergency planning process: U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, U.S. Department of Interior, U.S. Department of Transportation, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Representatives of these agencies serve on the FEMA Region II Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA. Each federal agency in the RAC has responsibility for ensuring that state and local preparedness is adequate to deal with a radiological emergency at a nuclear power plant. Each agency brings special expertise to the table that is important to understanding the strengths and weaknesses of the plans. Because emergency planning is highly interdisciplinary, involving a broader range of expertise makes it more likely that preparedness inadequacies will be recognized (assuming that evaluators are not afraid of reprisal for recognizing them).

UPCOMING EXERCISE AND RECENT TIMELINE

According to the March 9, 2004 Journal News article (“Drill to settle Indian Point plan’s worth”), the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Emergency Management Agency have gone on record saying that the agency will use the upcoming four-county exercise in early June to determine the effectiveness of emergency plans for Indian Point, ignoring the refusal by the State Emergency Management Office (SEMO) and the counties of Westchester, Rockland and Orange to certify that the plans could work. The exercise will be held in accordance with FEMA’s policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local radiological emergency response plans and procedures.

According to the March 9th Journal News article, FEMA has dropped its long-standing practice of basing its evaluation of the effectiveness of emergency plans on the state and county certifications, in addition to the biennial emergency simulation exercise. That change in a decades-long practice comes after the uproar created in 2003 when the SEMO and the four counties within 10 miles of Indian Point – Westchester, Rockland, Putnam and Orange – refused to certify the plans were updated and effective.

At first, FEMA wouldn’t approve the plans without the state and EPZ counties. In a February 21, 2003 letter to the state, FEMA said “in the absence of fully corrected and updated plans for the counties and State (FEMA) cannot provide reasonable assurance” that the emergency plans would work. (All nuclear plants are required to have effective emergency evacuation plans as a condition of their operating license issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.) However, FEMA would reverse its policy just months later. On July 25, 2003 FEMA approved the plans over the objections of the counties and state. FEMA’s decision was quickly supported by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Officials from the emergency planning zone counties – in particular, Westchester and Rockland – were angered by the federal government’s decision. On August 5, 2003, Westchester County Executive Spano and Rockland County Executive Vanderhoef sent freedom of information requests to the NRC and FEMA asking the federal agencies to hand over the documents the agencies reviewed before reaching the conclusion that the emergency plan would protect the public. To date, the NRC and FEMA have not cooperated with the counties’ request.

In what has become the height of absurdity, Craig Conklin, the Chief of DHS’s Nuclear and Chemical Hazards Branch, in a December 31, 2003 letter to Westchester County Executive Spano, wrote that in order “To assure that [FEMA’s] review is thorough, could you please provide FEMA with the “documentation” that you have to support your [FOI] request...” In other words, FEMA is asking the county for the very documents that the county is requesting from FEMA as part of the county’s effort to find out what FEMA reviewed prior to issuing its July 25, 2003 decision.

On August 22, 2003, Westchester County filed an administrative appeal to FEMA’s July 25th determination. The appeal is still under review by FEMA.

In a November 5, 2003 letter to DHS/FEMA, Rockland County Executive Vanderhoef argued that FEMA’s July 25th decision “is unsupported by (and it arbitrarily, capriciously disregards) the collective wisdom and expertise of local, county, and state emergency services professionals and elected officials.” Vanderhoef’s letter also stated that FEMA’s July 25th decision “is unsupported by (and it arbitrarily, capriciously disregards) the findings and conclusions developed by James Lee Witt.”

In mid-December of 2003 the counties of Westchester and Rockland publicly stated that they would not submit the annual certification letters (a checklist of letters of agreement, contracts, and equipment) to the New York State Emergency Management Office (SEMO). Likewise, Orange County in mid-January took the same action. In early March 2004, SEMO went on record stating that it would support the counties’ action. SEMO held the same position the year before, given New York State’s home rule policy.


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RIVERKEEPER & IPSEC LETTER TO DHS/FEMA


April 22, 2004

W. Craig Conklin
Chief Nuclear and Chemical Hazards Branch
Federal Emergency Management Agency
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
500 C Street, SW Washington, D.C. 20472

Michael D. Brown
Under Secretary
Emergency Preparedness and Response
Federal Emergency Management Agency
500 C Street, SW
Washington, D.C. 20472

Dear Mr. Craig Conklin and Mr. Michael Brown:

On behalf of Riverkeeper and the Indian Point Safe Energy Coalition, we are writing to request that the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Emergency Management Agency consider the enclosed recommendations which we firmly believe will enhance the upcoming emergency exercise on June 8th. Many of these recommendations have been made before, even prior to the Fall 2002 emergency exercise. DHS and FEMA have had ample time to incorporate these recommendations into the upcoming exercise.

If DHS and FEMA’s top priority is protecting public health and safety in the event of a radiological release at Indian Point, then the upcoming exercise must be as realistic as possible. The exercise must be based on a fast-breaking release scenario that results in the contamination of a significant portion of the 10-mile emergency planning zone and the 50-mile ingestion pathway zone. Only a realistic scenario could evaluate the true adequacy of Indian Point’s emergency plan. In addition, the whole exercise must be open to independent evaluation.

If you have any questions please contact Kyle Rabin from Riverkeeper at 845-424-4149 x 239. Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,


Alex Matthiessen,
Hudson Riverkeeper
& Executive Director
Riverkeeper, Inc.



Grant Captanian
Coordinator
IPSEC (Indian Point Safe Energy Coalition)

Cc:
Hon. Charles Schumer, U.S. Senator
Hon. Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Senator
Hon. Eliot L. Engel, U.S. Representative
Hon. Nita M. Lowey, U.S. Representative
Hon. Sue Kelly, U.S. Representative
Hon. Maurice Hinchey, U.S. Representative
Hon. George E. Pataki, Governor of New York State
Hon. Joseph Picciano, Acting Regional Director, FEMA Region II
Hon. Edward F. Jacoby Jr., Director of NY State Emergency Management Office
Hon. Edward Diana, Orange County Executive
Hon. Robert Bondi, Putnam County Executive
Hon. C. Scott Vanderhoef, Rockland County Executive
Hon. Andrew Spano, Westchester County Executive
Hon. A. Alan Seidman, Orange County Chairman of the Board of Legislators
Hon. Robert McGuigan, Putnam County Chairman of the Board of Legislators
Hon. Salvatore Corallo, Rockland County Chairman of the Board of Legislators
Hon. Bill Ryan, Westchester County Chairman of the Board of Legislators



INDIAN POINT SAFE ENERGY COALITION


15-POINT PLAN
To Strengthen the June 8th Emergency Exercise at Indian Point and
To Ensure the Exercise is Based on Realistic Scenarios

IPSEC coalition members are urging FEMA/DHS and NRC to:

1) Ensure that the exercise is based upon a scenario involving a fast breaking release of radiation that results in the contamination of a significant portion of the 10-mile emergency planning zone and the 50-mile ingestion pathway zone. (Federal government reports note that a radioactive release can begin is less than an hour.);

2) Ensure that the exercise is based upon a scenario that assesses the stress on limited emergency resources and personnel. (For example, a scenario involving multiple attacks in the region – i.e. on local bridges, roads, and electrical transmission lines – or a regional electrical blackout.);

3) Ensure that the exercise is based upon a scenario involving major transportation arteries that are rendered impassable (either by acts of terrorism or gridlock) to people evacuating. (Numerous traffic accidents and inclement weather in the region over the past few years reveal how vulnerable the region’s transportation infrastructure is to gridlock.);

4) Ensure that the exercise is based upon a scenario in which the radioactive plume travels beyond the 10-mile radius and threatens to expose citizens with higher-than-acceptable doses. (Federal Government reports acknowledge that dangerous levels of radiation can drift well beyond the 10-mile EPZ; even beyond the 50-mile ingestion pathway.);

5) Ensure that the exercise is based upon a scenario in which significant self-evacuation, or “shadow evacuation,” occurs beyond the 10-mile radius and as far away as 50 miles. (Academic research and the experience at Three Mile Island demonstrate there will be significant shadow evacuation outside of the 10-mile zone.);

6) Ensure that the exercise takes into consideration a large number of people, who have been injured and contaminated, requiring treatment and decontamination. (Medical personnel have expressed concerns about hospitals being overrun by citizens worried that they have been exposed to radiation and the ability to treat a large number of contaminated people.);

7) Ensure that the exercise assesses how long it takes various emergency officials to travel to the emergency joint news center – the hub for emergency notification operations – especially in the event of a fast breaking release scenario. The exercise should not begin with all the emergency personnel already at the joint news center. (As noted by county emergency officials, one of the problems presented by a fast breaking release and associated traffic congestion is that a large number of county, state, and federal emergency officials will be unable to get to the joint news center in a timely manner.);

8) Hold an “ingestion pathway” exercise which requires activities beyond the 10-mile radius emergency planning zone. (The 50-mile radius around a nuclear power plant is considered the ingestion planning zone which is the area within which people could be at risk if they eat or drink contaminated food or water.);

9) Ensure that the exercise involves the actual evacuation and sheltering of members of the public who have agreed to participate in the exercise. (In the past, FEMA has argued that involving the public in an exercise would endanger citizens and could result in injuries. FEMA’s flawed logic ignores the fact that through the proper training of those participating in the exercise, injury can be avoided not just in the exercise but in real life event. To assess the adequacy of Indian Point’s emergency plan to protect the public health and safety it is crucial to involve local citizens. Hundreds of thousands of citizens will likely flee in the event of a radiological emergency at Indian Point. At the very least, the exercise should involve one thousand citizens participating in various sub-exercises.);

10) Reduce the number of out-of-sequence exercises by holding exercises in-sequence and in real time during the June 8th exercise. (Out-of-sequence exercises are demonstrations of facilities and knowledge of procedures that occur out of sequence with the full-scale exercise scenario. Currently, these out-of-sequence exercises are done over the course of several months leading up to the exercise.);

11) Work with the counties to involve more local police and fire chiefs and town supervisors in the decision-making process and various sub-routines within the June 8th exercise;

12) Involve and cooperate with independent experts, like James Lee Witt Associates, to monitor and evaluate the exercise and publish their own findings. (The Governor Pataki-commissioned report by James Lee Witt Associates (JLWA) was well received. James Lee Witt and his colleagues are highly respected by the region’s elected officials, citizens and public interest groups. JLWA would be in the best position to evaluate whether the recommendations made in their March 2003 report were adopted. The JLWA report had criticized virtually every component of Indian Point’s emergency plan and in some cases made suggestions on how the plan and exercise could be improved.);

13) Involve elected officials at the local, state, and federal level; representatives from public interest groups; and members of the public as evaluators, observers and players. FEMA should provide training exercise evaluations to those selected to be evaluators. (The Governor Pataki-commissioned Witt report called for greater public involvement in emergency planning: “Cities, special facilities, private employers, and selected citizen groups or neighborhoods should be encouraged to participate in exercises. Elected officials should participate in exercises to make sure that the decision-making element is well represented and that they receive needed training. We further recommend that interested stakeholders be allowed to observe these exercises.”);

14) Include numerous sub-exercises that examine whether latchkey children, who lack adult supervision, will be protected in the event of radiological emergency at Indian Point. Latchkey children need to be treated as a special population, but FEMA has not effectively changed its plans to take latchkey children into account. Inadequacies in local emergency plans mean many children would be unable to evacuate or properly carry out sheltering procedures if an emergency occurred at the Indian Point nuclear power plant.; and

15) Ensure that all interoperability and other communications shortcomings, among the response agencies and jurisdictions, revealed in the September 2002 exercise have been completely resolved. It is critical that interoperability, especially in areas of hilly terrain, has been significantly improved to allow for the effective communication among senior agency and department personnel. (In the midst of an emergency, responders depend on a number of communications systems to transmit critical information and coordinate response and recovery actions. These systems can be as simple as two-way radios or as sophisticated as an interconnected network of computer systems and handheld computer devices. The key to the success of the overall communications system is the ability of different types of systems to communicate with each other, or interoperability, and the availability of the system during an emergency. The events of September 11, 2001 illustrate the importance of ensuring that emergency communications systems are interoperable and available.)

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In addition, DHS/FEMA should devise and publish a set of specific standards by which they evaluate the adequacy of the exercise and the plan as a whole. FEMA’s current standards are deliberately vague and allow the agency to sign off on an exercise that may be riddled with deficiencies.

Furthermore, DHS/FEMA must cooperate more with the EPZ counties particularly Westchester and Rockland whose recent Freedom of Information Law requests have been ignored by DHS/FEMA. This lack of cooperation inhibits the effectiveness of the exercise.

Finally, exercises should include a strong “lessons learned” component. The Witt report recommended: “Any weaknesses found in exercises should be traced back to changes needed in plans, training, policies, equipment, public education, or job responsibilities.” Any weaknesses that cannot be corrected for should be noted.