FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: 24 June 2003

CONTACT INFORMATION: 

Lisa Rainwater van Suntum, PhD, 212-544-0045 (IPSEC)

Kyle Rabin, 845-424-4149, ext. 239  (Riverkeeper)

                   FORCE-ON-FORCE FARCE COMING TO INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS THIS SUMMER:

 CITIZEN ADVOCATES DECLARE DRILL UNREALISTIC AND INADEQUATE TO ASSESS PLANT SECURITY DEFENSES

In this new post-9-11 era of terrorist attacks, color-coded terrorist alerts, and duct tape frenzies, security at US Nuclear Power Plants is being evaluated with antiquated, inadequate, and industry-favored plant security drills. 

BUCHANAN, NEW YORK (June 24, 2003) – At a press conference today, members of the Indian Point Safe Energy Coalition (IPSEC) alerted the public, elected officials and the media that the planned July force-on-force security drill for Indian Point fails in its mission to assess the ability of plant defenses to thwart a terrorist attack. The IPSEC coalition has pinpointed the drill’s major flaws and offers several recommendations for strengthening the drills in an effort to protect the public. Within the next few weeks, the Indian Point nuclear power plant will undergo a force-on-force security drill conducted by the Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation (OSRE) division of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).  Indian Point was selected as one of four facilities nationwide to undergo this type of security test this year. 

Considering that “the potential for 9/11 type attacks on nuclear power plants is high,” as stated in a July 2002 National Research Council report, there is an important need to test the ability of the Indian Point security force to withstand a ground attack carried out by a large number of terrorists, divided into 4 or 5 teams and originating from several directions. However, the newly revised drills conducted under the OSRE program are a farce.  Major aspects of the new OSRE drill not only favor the nuclear industry but nearly ensure that plant security succeeds in deterring the mock attack. Furthermore the drills do not test the ability of plant security to defend against an attack comparable to that on September 11th, which involved a group of 19 terrorists comprising several different teams.

Another obvious flaw is that the element of surprise has been removed from the terrorist scenario.  Furthermore, the NRC, after confirming in mid-February that the Indian Point site was chosen, has given Entergy several months of advance notice to prepare for the drill.  Industry watchdogs recommend a two-week notice, rather than several months, before a drill is conducted. While the actual test date remains top secret to the public, the narrow window of when the mock attack will be attempted is clear to Entergy.

“As has been the case all along, security at Indian Point is not adequate and these farcical drills are just the latest illustration of this fact,” comments Lisa Rainwater van Suntum, project coordinator of IPSEC, a coalition of over 55 citizen, environmental, health, and public policy organizations.  “IPSEC has based its call for Indian Point’s closure on a range of concerns, most notably, that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Entergy are not taking seriously the need to bolster and monitor security at Indian Point. And, lapses continue to occur.” Regarding the issue of advance notice provided by the NRC, the federal agency that is supposed to serve as a watchdog of the nuclear industry, van Suntum points out, “This is like saying that terrorists would call up Entergy months in advance and let them know when they plan to attack.  The public is being duped and put in jeopardy by this farcical drill.”

The upcoming drill will be a typical OSRE drill in that Captain David Orrik, OSRE program specialist, and his team of consultants, after arriving at Indian Point, will evaluate certain aspects of plant defenses like adequacy of intrusion detection systems and competency of armed responders on the firing range. Capt. Orrik and his team will then participate in a “tabletop” exercise with the plant’s security managers. During this tabletop, Capt. Orrik and his team will look for weak spots in the plant’s defenses, including response strategies of the armed guards. Capt. Orrik will then specify four OSRE exercises: where the mock intruders will enter and what target set they will go after.  Indian Point personnel, or their contractors, will then perform the role of the defenders and the attackers. Capt. Orrik and his team are observers to monitor how the four exercises go.

Given the NRC’s advanced warning, Entergy’s Vice President of Operations at Indian Point, Fred Dacimo, addressed the plants’ security officers on April 21, 2003 in an internal memo (obtained by POGO—the Project on Government Oversight): “To prepare for this exercise . . . will require you to work longer hours during the next ten weeks to sharpen your skills . . . to execute the training and drill schedule, may require working additional hours, five twelve-hour days and occasionally six twelve-hour days.”  In addition, if the execution of the force-on-force test is successful, Dacimo offered a bonus of $500, to “those security officers, who don’t callout sick and remain accident free.”

To “sharpen” their skills, security guards at the plants are now being coerced to work mandatory overtime (60 hours per week), despite recent reports of being so overworked and exhausted that some guards have fallen asleep at their posts.  The phrase “remain accident free” was included in the memo because any injury that occurs during the drill is classified as a general plant accident and counts against the company during the OSRE drill.  Given all these circumstances, it is noteworthy that the OSRE drill at Indian Point, originally slated for June has been rescheduled for July due to the nature of the Dacimo internal memo.

Another major flaw in the exercise is the grading of the force-on-force exercises.  Unlike real life—where a single mistake or error could be fatal—the mock drills allow a passing grade of 75% for the continued operation of the given plant.  “The public is entitled to know if a minor deviation from protocol is counted equally to an error that could directly result in a successful attack when the tests are graded,” states Lisa Rainwater van Suntum.  “If this event were real, the lives of 300,000 citizens within the 10-mile evacuation zone and 20-million Americans in a 50-mile radius would be jeopardized.  With those stakes, should we be requiring only a good effort?”

In comparison to the NRC’s OSRE program, the U.S. Department of Energy’s force-on-force program requires facilities under their jurisdiction to provide security capable of defending against a larger group of attackers.  “We question why an NRC security drill, especially a drill in the most densely populated area of the country, would have lower standards,” said Rainwater van Suntum.

Other major flaws in the exercise include:

IPSEC recommends that the OSRE drills: 1) be declared only two weeks in advance; 2) have a 100% success rate in deterring mock attackers; 3) involve real-time attack scenarios, including daytime hours and simulated outage periods; 4) involve an active role for insider mock terrorist; 5) involve mock attackers originating from multiple directions; 6) involve at least 20 mock attackers divided into several teams; 7) include the irradiated fuel pools as a target in at least one exercise; 8) allow for public input/comment; 9) if they reveal repeated poor performance, should lead to immediate closure of plant until performance is improved; and 10) allow for independent observers to monitor and evaluate.

For more a detailed critique of the new force-on-force nuclear plant security test go to: www.IPSECinfo.org (IPSEC Issue Briefs) and www.riverkeeper.org.  To view the Entergy Memo, go to: www.pogo.org

Indian Point Safe Energy Coalition (IPSEC). IPSEC is a coalition of fifty-eight civic, environmental, health and public policy organizations that formed in response to a flood of citizen concerns about the safety of Indian Point nuclear power plants after the terrorist attacks on 9.11.01.  Our goal is to ensure the safety and security of our neighborhoods by bringing about the immediate closure of Indian Point and its safe and orderly decommissioning.   A list of the IPSEC member groups can be viewed at www.IPSECinfo.org

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